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Socioeconomic Rights Adjudication in Canada: Can the Minimum 
Core Help in Adjudicating the Rights to Life and Security of the 





Les manquements aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels (DES) fondamentaux 
minimaux privent les personnes et les groupes les plus vulnérables de la société des 
ressources nécessaires à leur vie et à leur bien-être rudimentaire. Les États ont 
l’obligation d’assurer la disponibilité de recours significatifs pour de tels manquements. 
Bien que l’articulation d’une obligation fondamentale minimum en matière de DES 
présente certains défis, et que les critiques de ce concept croient que les tribunaux n’ont 
pas la compétence institutionnelle requise pour le mettre en œuvre, il s’agit tout de même 
d’un outil important pour la prise de décision. L’obligation fondamentale minimum met 
l’accent sur la recherche des objectifs sous-jacents des droits de la personne : la 
protection des groupes vulnérables et marginalisés contre les formes les plus graves de 
dépravation et de souffrance. Elle renforce l’indivisibilité et l’interdépendance – et 
conséquemment la justiciabilité – de tous les droits de la personne. Prenant à titre 
d’exemples deux décisions récentes relatives aux droits à un logement adéquat et aux 
soins de santé au Canada, cet article avance que l’obligation fondamentale minimum est 
prometteuse. En effet, elle peut servir d’aide à l’interprétation dans l’évaluation du 
contenu des droits à la vie et à la sécurité de sa personne, en vertu de l’article 7 de la 
Charte, et ce, en respectant pleinement les limites institutionnelles applicables et les 
obligations internationales du Canada en matière de droits de la personne.  
 
Violations of the minimum core economic and social rights (ESR) deprive society’s 
most vulnerable individuals and groups of the very resources that are essential to life and 
basic well-being. States have an obligation to ensure that meaningful remedies are 
available for such infringements. Though articulating a minimum core for ESR poses 
challenges, and critics of the concept find it beyond the institutional competence of 
courts, it remains an important tool for adjudication. The minimum core focuses the 
inquiry on the underlying goals of human rights: the protection of vulnerable and 
marginalized groups from the most serious forms of deprivation and suffering. It 
reinforces the indivisibility and interdependence—and, consequently, the justiciability—
of all human rights. Using the examples of two recent cases considering the rights to 
adequate housing and health care in Canada, this paper suggests that the minimum core 
may have potential to serve as a useful interpretive aid to assess the content of rights to 
life and security of the person under section 7 of the Charter, in full respect of 
institutional boundaries, and in a matter that is consistent with Canada’s international 
human rights obligations.  
 
                                                 
*
Ania Kwadrans is a member of the Ontario Bar. She articled at Amnesty International, has worked for the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, and is currently National Coordinator at the Refugee Sponsorship Support 
Program. Thank you to all of the anonymous reviewers for comments on a previous draft. Special thanks to Bruce 
Porter and Professor Janet Mosher for their indispensable advice, guidance, and encouragement.  
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THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING has identified 
homelessness as “an extreme violation of the rights to adequate housing and non-discrimination, 
and often also a violation of the rights to life, to security of the person … and to freedom from 
cruel and inhuman treatment.”
1
 Yet, as the Special Rapporteur observes, homelessness “has not 
been addressed with the urgency and priority that ought to be accorded to so widespread and 
severe a violation of human rights.”
2
 Indeed, in 2007, Miloon Kothari, the former Special 
Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, noted with alarm that,  
 
Canada has [had] a reputation around the world for its progressive housing policies 
and programmes, but that is no longer the case … Canada’s successful social housing 
programme, which created more than half a million homes starting in 1973, no 
longer exists. Canada has fallen behind most countries in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development in its level of investment in affordable 





Despite the massive scope of the problem and its terrible impact on the lives and security of 
hundreds of thousands of Canada’s most vulnerable, Canadian courts have had only one 
opportunity to consider the human rights implications of Canadian governments’ failure to act to 
alleviate this suffering.
4
 In the case of Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General),
5
 the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice and a majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario denied the 
applicants, all poor and suffering from homelessness or inadequate housing, access to a hearing.
6
 
By dismissing the case, on a motion brought by the respondents, as disclosing no reasonable 
cause of action, the courts effectively denied at the outset the possibility that the crisis may 
                                                 
1
 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to 
an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, 31st Sess, UN Doc 
A/HRC/31/54 (30 December 2015) at para 4, online: <daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/294/ 
52/PDF/G1529452.pdf> [Special Rapporteur on Housing].  
2
 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the 
right to an adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari, 61st Sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/48 (3 March 2005), 
summary, online: <daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/103/60/PDF/G0510360.pdf>. 
3
 As cited in Michael Shapcott, “UN to Canada: Take action on housing, homelessness!” Wellesley Institute (22 
October 2007) online: Wellesley Institute <wellesleyinstitute.com/housing/un_to_canada__take_action_ 
on_housing__homelessness_/> [perma.cc/P8RL-Y8N5]. 
4
 There have been at least two cases which have considered the human rights of the homeless: Victoria (City) v 
Adams, 2009 BCCA 563, 313 DLR (4th) 29 [Adams] and BC/Yukon Association of Drug Survivors v Abbotsford 
(City), 2014 BCSC 1817 [Abbotsford]. However, unlike Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 5410, 
116 OR (3d) 574 [Tanudjaja, ONSC] and Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 852, 123 OR (3d) 
161 [Tanudjaja, ONCA]—which were a direct challenge to the failure of governments in Canada to devise an 
effective strategy to reduce and eliminate homelessness, and which sought a remedy requiring the governments to 
take positive action to eliminate homelessness and inadequate housing—Adams and Abbotsford considered the 
narrower issue of the legality of bylaws that penalize actions associated with being homeless, such as the erection of 
temporary shelters in public areas.  
5
 Tanudjaja, ONSC and Tanudjaja, ONCA, supra note 4. 
6
 Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied.  
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engage Canada’s obligations to protect the rights to life and security of the person under section 
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter).
7
 
 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has stated that, 
much like the right to be free from homelessness, “[h]ealth is a fundamental human right 
indispensable for the exercise of other human rights.”
8
 Louise Arbour, former Supreme Court of 
Canada (SCC) justice and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stressed that health 
care is “a cornerstone of Canadian values, a way of honouring our fundamental commitment to 
each other” and “a matter of obligation at law owing to a duty which goes to the core of the 
protection and promotion of human dignity.”
9
 Yet in 2012, the federal government implemented 
drastic cuts to its Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP), which had the effect of denying 
necessary health care to many refugees and refugee claimants.
10
 When the constitutionality of the 
cuts was challenged before the Federal Court of Canada (FC) in Canadian Doctors for Refugee 
Care v Canada,
11
 despite making a factual finding that the denial of health services resulting 
from the cuts to the IFHP “are causing illness, disability, and death,”
12
 the FC refused to find that 
the rights to life and security of the person under section 7 of the Charter were engaged. The FC 
held that because the government had “intentionally set out to make the lives of these 
disadvantaged individuals even more difficult than they already are,”
13
 the targeted cuts to the 
IFHP constituted cruel and unusual treatment prohibited under section 12 of the Charter. 
However, the court found that the right to life, on its own, imposes no obligations on 
governments to ensure access to health care necessary for life. 
 In both cases, poor, vulnerable, sick, and marginalized individuals were denied access to 
meaningful remedies for their claims under the Charter section 7 rights to life and security of the 
person based on a rigid, arbitrary, and outdated distinction between positive and negative rights 
and concerns regarding justiciability that flow from that distinction. This paper aims to challenge 
that position. Denying access to rights claims and remedies based on section 7 of the Charter to 
individuals who are ill, disabled, and who are dying because they are denied access to necessary 
shelter or health care starkly demonstrates that new judicial approaches are required to deal with 
these problems and increase access to justice for those whom the government has disempowered. 
 This paper looks to international human rights law, and in particular the concept of 
minimum core obligations, as a potential tool towards achieving this goal. It argues that the 
approach of the Canadian judiciary is inconsistent with Canada’s international human rights 
obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
                                                 
7
 See Tracy Heffernan, Fay Faraday & Peter Rosenthal, “Fighting for the Right to Housing in Canada” (2015) 24 JL 
& Soc Pol’y 10; Margot Young, “Charter Eviction: Litigating Out of House and Home” (2015) 24 JL & Soc Pol’y 
46 [Young, “Charter Eviction”]; Yutaka Dirks, “Community Campaigns for the Right to Housing: Lessons from the 
R2H Coalition of Ontario” (2015) 24 JL & Soc Pol’y 135. 
8
 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 4: The Right to the highest attainable standard of health, 
22nd Sess, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) at para 1 [General Comment 14].  
9
 Louise Arbour, “LaFontaine-Baldwin lecture ‘Freedom from want’: from charity to entitlement” (3 March 2005) 
online: United Nations Human Rights <ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=3004 
&LangID=E> [perma.cc/8D2G-CR56].  
10
 In addition, migrants had already largely been, and continue to be, excluded from accessing benefits under the 
IFHP prior to the 2012 cuts.  
11
 Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 651, 28 Imm LR (4th) 1 [Canadian 
Doctors]. An appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal was withdrawn by a newly elected federal government in 
December 2015. 
12
 Ibid at para 1049.  
13
 Ibid at para 10. 
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(ICESCR), which not only require States Parties to progressively realize economic and social 
rights (ESR), but also to guarantee a basic minimum core content of these rights. Interpreted 
consistently with international human rights law, the minimum core can play an important role in 
informing the interpretation of section 7 of the Charter. 
 This paper begins by setting out that ESR, like the right to health and housing, are 
interdependent with and indivisible from all other human rights. Deprivations of housing, water, 
food, or health are often issues of life or death because they constitute denials of the necessities 
of life. This paper then introduces the concept of the minimum core, a presumptive legal 
obligation to provide all individuals within a State Party’s territory or under its jurisdiction a 
basic level of ESR. Any failure to provide minimum core entitlements must be strictly justified 
by demonstrating that the State Party has endeavoured to use all resources available to satisfy 
those obligations.  
 The minimum core has been subject to vigorous scholarly debate. Critics of the minimum 
core argue that it sets out obligations in absolute and rigid terms that are not reflective of 
different countries’ socioeconomic and cultural realities. Conversely, adopting relative 
definitions of the minimum core to reflect those differences makes the concept impossible to 
articulate in universal terms. Critics also assert that because the fulfilment of ESR entails 
positive action on behalf of the state in terms of policy-making and budgetary allocations, these 
matters are unsuitable for the judiciary to consider.  
This paper relies on the example of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (CCSA), 
which has explicitly considered the use of the minimum core in ESR adjudication.
14
 Agreeing 
with the critics, the CCSA has rejected the minimum core and instead adopted a reasonableness 
approach for assessing government policies on the provision of ESR. There are examples where 
the CCSA’s reasonableness approach has led to the ordering of substantive entitlements. 
Nevertheless, proponents of the minimum core worry that an approach to adjudication based 
solely on the reasonableness test in the abstract, absent any delineation of the content or scope of 
the ESR in question, runs the danger of depriving those rights of specific content and 
legitimizing the continued hardship suffered by society’s most vulnerable individuals.  
However, acknowledging the conceptual difficulties with the minimum core, much of the 
debate has moved towards preserving some of its key features—the need to give substance to 
ESR and subject governments to a higher level of scrutiny—to bolster the reasonableness 
approach and to encourage defining the substantive content of ESR. Substantive reasonableness 
requires courts to consider at the outset the needs and interests of the claimants. Then, courts 
must determine whether those needs and interests fall within the scope of the right in question 
and the weight to be accorded to them. Only against this backdrop should a government policy 
be assessed.  
 This paper considers how substantive reasonableness and the values underlying the 
minimum core may apply to the Canadian context. This paper suggests that the systematic 
deprivation of health care from refugees, refugee claimants, and irregular migrants, and 
widespread homelessness and inadequate housing in an affluent country such as Canada both 
                                                 
14
 Section 1(1) of the Citation of Constitutional Laws, 2005 (Act No. 5 of 2005). The minimum core was considered 
in the context of claims for the violation of the rights to housing and health under Sections 26 and 27 of the South 
African Constitution. Section 26 of the Constitution provides that “Everyone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing. Similarly, Section 27 guarantees to everyone the right to have access to health care services, sufficient food 
and water, and social security. With regard to both sets of rights, the Constitution requires the government “take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of 
this right.” 
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constitute crises that trigger positive obligations to remedy those deprivations. In both cases, 
Canadian courts have declined to consider these issues in light of section 7 of the Charter as 
matters of the rights to life and security of the person.
15
 This constitutes an increasing divergence 
from the norms established in international human rights law regarding the interdependence and 
indivisibility—and, consequently, justiciability—of all human rights. 
 This paper concludes by exploring whether the minimum core and substantive 
reasonableness approaches may provide courts with a useful interpretive tool to meaningfully 
vindicate human rights. This paper suggests that the minimum core may assist in more clearly 
determining which needs and interests are justiciable under section 7 of the Charter. It also 
proposes that under section 1 of the Charter, the minimum core may invite a greater degree of 
scrutiny into, and less deference towards, government budgetary choices. Further inquiry into the 
concept’s applicability to Charter proportionality inquiries is warranted. Finally, this paper 
suggests that incorporating a minimum core or substantive reasonableness approach may 
promote democratic dialogue by giving a voice to the vulnerable and marginalized.  
 
I. THE INTERDEPENDENCE AND INDIVISIBILITY (AND 
JUSTICIABILITY) OF ALL HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
States Parties to the ICESCR
16
 have undertaken to “take steps … to the maximum of [their] 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the [ICESCR] by all appropriate means.”
17
 The historical separation of civil and 
political rights, enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
18
 
from the ESR, set out in the ICESCR, has led to the misconception that civil and political rights 
are enforceable in courts while ESR are not justiciable. Adherents of this view argue that unlike 
civil and political rights, which are negative rights constituting restraints on government action, 
ESR prescribe positive government action that is better left to the political realm.
19
 As further 
evidence of this distinction between negative and positive (and justiciable and non-justiciable) 
rights, they point to the fact that the ICESCR requires States Parties only to “progressively 
realize” ESR; that, unlike the ICCPR,
20
 the ICESCR does not include the right to access to justice 
                                                 
15
 In Tanudjaja, ONSC and Tanudjaja, ONCA, supra note 4, by determining on a preliminary motion that the claim, 
including under section 7, did not disclose a reasonable cause of action because it was not justiciable; and in 
Canadian Doctors, supra note 11, by finding that section 7 was not engaged by the claim. 
16
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, Can TS 1976 
No 46 [ICESCR]. Canada is a State Party to the ICESCR. 
17
 Ibid art 2.  
18
 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Can TS 1976 No 47. 
19
 Malcolm Langford, “The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory” in Malcolm Langford, ed, 
Social Right Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) at 8.  
20
 Supra note 18. Part II Art. 2(3) states: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any 
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person 
claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when 
granted.  
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and an effective remedy for rights violations; and that the ICCPR contains an optional 
complaints procedure while at its inception the ICESCR did not.
21
 
 This distinction between positive and negative rights has now largely been rejected by the 
international community and in academic circles. The justiciability of ESR has also been 
established through national constitutions that incorporate ESR as legally enforceable and 
constitutionally binding.
22
 Further, in many contexts where ESR are not explicitly 
constitutionally protected, judiciaries have affirmed the interdependence and indivisibility of all 
human rights by linking ESR matters to the rights (among others) to life, security of the person, 
non-discrimination, and freedom from cruel and inhuman treatment.
23
 
 Craig Scott and Patrick Macklem characterize the debate as casting “positive and 
negative freedom as theatrical rivals rather than supporting actors.”
24
 And as the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health put it, “[t]he division between both sets of rights is artificial, 
given there is no intrinsic difference between them. Both may require positive actions, are 
resource-dependent and are justiciable.”
25
 Traditional “negative” rights require positive 
government action to establish a governmental apparatus to secure these rights for individuals.
26
 
This includes the appointment and training of public officials, monitoring mechanisms, and the 
maintenance of accountability mechanisms. On the other hand, ESR also place negative duties 
on governments. Absent compelling justifications, governments have a duty to refrain from 
interfering with ESR-related resources that individuals already possess.
27
  
                                                 
21
 Bruce Porter, “Rethinking Progressive Realization: How should it be implemented in Canada?” Background 
Paper for a Presentation to the Continuing Committee of Officials on Human Rights (4 June 2015), online: Social 
Rights Advocacy Centre <socialrights.ca/documents/publications/Porter%20Progressive%20Implementation.pdf> 
[perma.cc/L4ZZ-8U7F].  
22
 E.g., Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Portugal, Russia, South Korea, Spain, South 
Africa, Venezuela.  
23
 In India, for example, the High Court of Delhi in Laxmi Mandal v Deen Dayal Harinagar Hospital and Others, 
WP(C) 8853/2008, Judgment of 4 June 2010, High Court of Delhi at para 20 stated: “The right to health [forms] an 
inalienable component of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.” And the Indian Supreme Court in 
Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union, (1981) 1981 AIR 746, 1981 SCR (2) 516 at para 6 stated: “The 
right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely the bare necessaries 
of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in 
diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings.” As another example, 
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has established that “[the] right to life is not only limited to the protection of life 
and limbs but extends to the protection of health and strength of workers, their means of livelihood, enjoyment of 
pollution free water and air, bare necessaries of life, facilities for education, development of children, maternity 
benefit, free movement, maintenance and improvement of public health by creating and sustaining conditions 
congenial to good health and ensuring quality of life consistent with human dignity” in Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v 
Bangladesh 48 DLR (1996) 438 at para 17. 
24
 Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, “Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New 
South African Constitution” (1992) 141 U PA L Rev 1 at 85.  
25
 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, 69th Sess, UN Doc A/69/299 (11 August 2014) at para 7. 
26
 Cass R Sunstein, “Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa” (2001) 11:4 Constitutional Forum 
123 at 124. 
27
 David Bilchitz, “Socio-economic rights, economic crisis, and legal doctrine” (2014) 12:3 IJCL 710 at 714 
[Bilchitz, “Socio-economic rights”]; Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others (CCT 11/00) [2001] 1 SA 46 at para 34, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 [Grootboom]. 
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 In 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
28
 was adopted at the World 
Conference on Human Rights. The Declaration emphasized that “[a]ll human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated” and emphasized that “[t]he 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the 
same footing and with the same emphasis.”
29
 In 1997, a group of more than 30 experts adopted 
the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which 
affirmed that any person or group whose ESR are violated “should have access to effective 
judicial or appropriate remedies at both national and international levels” and stressed that “[t]he 
fact that the full realization of most [ESR] can only be achieved progressively, which in fact also 
applies to most civil and political rights, does not alter the nature of the legal obligation of States 
… .”
30
 Finally, in 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted an optional complaints procedure 




 In 2003, the CESCR, the treaty body tasked with clarifying the provisions of the ICESCR 
and promoting and monitoring State Party compliance with the Covenant, emphasized States 
Parties’ obligation under Article 2 of the ICESCR to employ “appropriate means” to realize ESR. 
Based on this principle, the Committee affirmed that “whenever a Covenant right cannot be 
made fully effective without some role for the judiciary, judicial remedies are necessary.”
32
 
While the Committee has recognized that the right to an effective remedy may not require a 
judicial remedy in all cases, and that administrative remedies may suffice where they are 
“accessible, affordable, timely and effective,” it has made clear that any classification of ESR as 
“beyond the reach of the courts” is “incompatible with the principle that the two sets of human 
rights are indivisible and interdependent” and would “drastically curtail the capacity of the courts 
to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society.”
33
  
Likewise, the UN Human Rights Committee, the treaty body for the ICCPR, has linked 
poverty and deprivation to a threat to the right to life,
34
 and consistently found that the rights 
guaranteed under the ICCPR contain positive obligations
35











                                                 
28
 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 
25 June 1993), online: OHCHR <ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx> [perma.cc/YP7N-ZNDD]. 
29
 Ibid at para 5.  
30
 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (22–26 January 1997) at paras 8, 
22, online: University of Minnesota Human Rights Library <umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html> 
[perma.cc/W27K-JHRR]. 
31
 Porter, supra note 21 at 2. 
32
 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of 
the Covenant, 19th Sess, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24 (3 December 1998) at para 9 [General Comment 9]. 
33
 Ibid at paras 9–10.  
34
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality of Rights Between Men and 
Women), 68th Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (29 March 2000) at para 10.  
35
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), 16th Sess (30 April 1982) at 
para 5. 
36
 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, 72nd Sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/CO/72/PRK (27 August 2001) at para 16 
37
 UN Human Rights Committee. Ms. Yekaterina Pavlovna Lantsova v The Russian Federation, Communication No. 
763/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/763/1997 (2002) at para 9.2; Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations 
on the third periodic report of Paraguay, 107th Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/PRY/CO/3 (29 April 2013) at para 13; 
Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, 77th Sess, UN Doc 
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II. THE MINIMUM CORE 
 
In establishing the obligation to progressively realize ESR, the ICESCR acknowledged that the 
full realization of all ESR may not be immediately attainable by States Parties, particularly when 
resource constraints are considered.
40
 At the same time, the CESCR worried that progressive 
realization would be misinterpreted as somehow making ESR entirely aspirational: 
 
[T]he fact that realization over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen 
under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all 
meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the 
realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring 
full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the phrase 
must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the 
Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the 
full realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as 




The CESCR has developed a number of approaches to countering the idea that progressive 
realization does not impose any immediate obligations on states. It emphasizes that states have 
an obligation to take steps toward the full realization of Covenant rights which are “deliberate, 
concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the 
Covenant”
42
 and that obligations to “devise strategies and programmes for their promotion, are 
not in any way eliminated as a result of resource constraints.”
43
 States have an obligation under 
article 2 of the ICESCR to “to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive 
implementation” of each of the rights contained in the Covenant by developing “clearly stated 
and carefully targeted policies, including the establishment of priorities which reflect the 
provisions of the Covenant.”
44
 Ensuring non-discriminatory enjoyment of ESR is also an 
                                                                                                                                                             
CCPR/CO/77MLI (16 April 2003) at para 14; Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: The Gambia, 81st Sess, UN Doc CCPR/CO/75/GMB (12 August 2004) at para 17; Human 
Rights Committee, Concluding observations by the Human Rights Committee: Venezuela, 71st Sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/CO/71/VEN (26 April 2001) at para 19; Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: Guatemala, 72nd Sess, UN Doc CCPR/CO/72/GTM (27 August 2001) at para 19; UN Human 
Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Kosovo (Serbia), 87th Sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1 (14 August 2006) at para 14.  
38
 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Canada, 65th Sess, UN 
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CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (3 September 2010) at paras 18, 24. 
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immediate obligation under the Covenant.
45
 In addition, the CESCR has developed and applied 
the concept of minimum core obligations for ESR.  
 The minimum core constitutes “minimum essential levels of each of the rights” that 
States Parties are required to satisfy immediately rather than to progressively realize, including 
“essential foodstuffs, essential primary health care, basic shelter and housing, or the most basic 
forms of education ….”
46
 The minimum core serves as a basis for enforcing a basic substantive 
level of ESR and for delineating immediate obligations.
47
 The minimum core is a presumptive 
legal obligation. States Parties bear a heavy burden in justifying a failure to meet this obligation: 
they must demonstrate that “every effort has been made to use all resources that are at [their] 
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.”
48
  
 The concept of the minimum core as a tool for the vulnerable to claim tangible, essential 
resources necessary for the fulfilment of a minimally acceptable standard of life has been subject 
to vigorous scholarly debate. Critics of the approach maintain that an absolute, universal 
minimum core is impossible to articulate given the highly contextualized nature of 
socioeconomic needs and challenges that countries face.
49
 Differing degrees of economic wealth 
and diverse social structures among countries may result in varied conceptualizations of the 
minimum core of ESR.
50
 Consequently, any universal conception of these rights is thought to be 
“trimmed, honed, and shorn of deontological excess.”
51
 Critics also argue that delivering the 
minimum core is impractical due to resource constraints and competing needs and interests. They 
also posit that it creates obligations that are exclusively positive and thus beyond the competence 
of judiciaries, undermining deliberative democracy.
52
  
 Many questions and difficulties arise when attempting to articulate the minimum core. 
Should we conceptualize the essential minimum of an ESR as the necessities for mere survival or 
those required to maintain human dignity and foster human flourishing?
53
 The minimum core’s 
content will differ depending on which of these two normative foundations an advocate adopts. 
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See also Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines, An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981). 
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Which countries, branches of government, or organizations should be given the power to define 
what substantive immediate guarantees ESR carry?
54
 Is the minimum core to be determined in 
the abstract and therefore universally, or is it context-specific, to be determined on a case-by-
case basis, such that any conceptualization of a minimum core is relative to the socioeconomic 
conditions of a particular state? If the minimum core is founded in survival needs, what 
relevance does the concept have to middle- and high-income countries? When facing resource 
constraints, how is a state to prioritize certain ESR entitlements over others?
55
 For example, 
should an HIV-positive person who needs retroviral medications to live be prioritized over an 
individual who suffers from chronic, debilitating migraines that seriously erode her dignity and 
quality of life?
56
 In other words, “must life always prevail over quality of life?”
57
 Sandra 
Liebenberg explains that the difficulty with the minimum core “is that social needs are in fact 
interconnected and that no clear-cut distinction exists between core and non-core needs” and that 
the approach “does not reflect the fact that people may have other important needs which do not 
meet the threshold for survival, but which warrant prior consideration in a constitutional order 
founded on the values of human dignity, equality and freedom.”
58
 
 Critics also argue that the minimum core approach inappropriately infringes on the 
separation of powers, and that determining the scope of the minimum core is beyond the 
institutional competence of courts.
59
 This critique rests in the concern that in adjudicating on the 
content and scope of ESR, judges “will assume greater power over setting socioeconomic policy, 
which they are neither competent enough to decide nor accountable enough to administer.”
60
 
Carol Steinberg argues that courts applying the minimum core approach and ordering the 
fulfillment of a minimum content of ESR amounts to placing a “constitutional straightjacket” on 
the legislature.
61
 Moreover, she states that the minimum core approach may even have negative 
systemic effects by triggering a backlash to perceived judicial activism against democratically 




 These concerns can be roughly grouped into three categories: (1) difficulties in defining 
the content of the minimum core; (2) challenges in meeting a diversity of needs when under 
resource constraints; and (3) concerns regarding institutional roles.
63
 These apprehensions led the 
CCSA, which explicitly considered the application of the minimum core, to reject its use. With 
respect to the right to adequate housing, the Court stated in Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others:
64
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It is not possible to determine the minimum threshold for the progressive realization 
of the right to access to adequate housing without first identifying the needs and 
opportunities for the enjoyment of such a right. These will vary according to factors 
such as income, unemployment, availability of land and poverty. The differences 
between city and rural communities will also determine the needs and opportunities 
for the enjoyment of this right. Variations ultimately depend on the economic and 
social history and circumstances of a country. All this illustrates the complexity of 
the task of determining a minimum core obligation for the progressive realisation of 
the right of access to adequate housing without having the requisite information on 
the needs and the opportunities for the enjoyment of this right …. The determination 
of a minimum core in the context of the “right to have access to adequate housing” 
presents difficult questions. This is so because the needs in the context of adequate 
housing are diverse: there are those who need land; others need both land and houses; 
yet others need financial assistance. There are difficult questions relating to the 
definition of the minimum core in the context of a right to have access to adequate 
housing, in particular whether the minimum core obligation should be defined 




The CCSA held that questions of socioeconomic policy are primarily a matter for the 
legislature and the executive, and so in any ESR challenge, rather than considering the 
content of the rights in question, the court will examine “whether the legislative and other 
measures taken by the state are reasonable.”
 66
 The CCSA elaborated that the reasonableness 
standard will not require courts to consider whether “other more desirable or favourable 
measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent,” 
because “a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its 
obligations” which would all satisfy the reasonableness test.
67
  
The CCSA developed a set of criteria for assessing whether a government programme or 
policy is reasonable. The CESCR subsequently adopted these criteria as the test to be used 
in the ICESCR’s optional complaints mechanisms.
68
 Consequently, these criteria became 
integrated into international human rights law. The reasonableness factors include:  
 
(a) The extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete and targeted 
toward the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights; 
(b) Whether the State party exercised its discretion in a non-discriminatory and non-
arbitrary manner; 
(c) Whether the State party’s decision (not) to allocate available resources was in 
accordance with international human rights standards; 
(d) Where several policy options are available, whether  the State party adopted the 
option that least restricts Covenant rights;  
                                                 
65
 Grootboom, supra note 27 at paras 32–33.  
66
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67
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68
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General Comments, Reports, and other commentary.  
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(e) The time frame in which the steps were taken; 
(f) Whether the steps had taken into account the precarious situation of disadvantaged 
and marginalized individuals or groups and, whether they were non-discriminatory, 




Given the difficulties of the minimum core approach, reasonableness is often perceived as a 
more accommodating option for adjudicating ESR. As noted by Liebenberg, the reasonableness 
approach provides courts “with a flexible and context-sensitive basis for evaluating socio-
economic rights claims” by allowing “government the space to design and formulate appropriate 
policies to meet its socio-economic rights obligations.”
70
 Meanwhile, reasonableness mandates 
continued scrutiny of government policies to ensure that they adhere to the requirement of 
inclusiveness and prioritize relief to the most vulnerable and marginalized in society.
71
 
 The requirement to prioritize individuals and groups whose needs are the most urgent is 
seen in particular to set a threshold requirement that gives ESR substantive content. And indeed, 
in some cases the reasonableness approach has led the CCSA to order the provision of specific 
necessary goods and services, such as antiretroviral medication to prevent mother-to-child HIV 
transmission,
72
 and social assistance to permanent residents in South Africa.
73
  
 Nevertheless, some scholars remain concerned that even in these successful cases, the 
court focused only on the reasonableness of the government action while avoiding giving content 
and scope to the ESR in question. In Liebenberg’s view, because the reasonableness approach 
does not begin “with a principled focus on the content and scope of the right and situation of the 
claimants,” it relieves states of having to provide justifications for rights infringements.
74
 
Similarly, Stuart Wilson and Jackie Dugard argue that applying the reasonableness test in the 
abstract of any understanding of the interests and needs in question,  
 
[undercuts] the court’s ability to engage head on with the claimants’ needs and lived 
experiences of poverty. Instead, the Court tends to prefer a facial examination of 
state policy, implicitly accepting the conceptions of reasonableness and possibility 
upon which those policies are drafted and implemented. This tends to reproduce the 
exclusion from policy formulation and implementation processes which have brought 




Thus, the reasonableness approach has been criticized for potentially fostering the problem 
that originally concerned the CESCR with respect to progressive realization: the danger that 
ESR will be deprived of any meaningful content and enable the continued suffering of the 
                                                 
69
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most vulnerable and marginalized. David Bilchitz argues that the minimum core is necessary 
to clarify precise state obligations in relation to ESR: “The current system of invoking the 
amorphous notion of reasonableness does not provide a clear and principled basis for the 
evaluation of the state’s conduct by judges or other branches of government in future cases.”
76
 
Marius Pieterse contends that rejecting the minimum core results in “the ‘dumbing down’ of 
the content of social rights, which seem … to boil down to only a general expectation on the 
state to act reasonably in its attempts to realize these rights.”
77
 He adds that the 
reasonableness standard fails to acknowledge and prioritize the hardship ESR claimants face, 
and that this approach is thus ineffective at correcting “the diminution of human dignity 
suffered as a result of such hardship.”
78
 
 Indeed, as Kameshni Pillay observes, these concerns manifested in the aftermath of 
the Grootboom decision. In a study of the implementation of the CCSA’s judgment two years 
later, Pillay found that community members did not experience any significant improvements 
in their daily lives. They still lived with rudimentary housing built so densely that there was a 
constant threat of fires erupting, and with inadequate sanitation that led to flooding and 
illness.
79
 The same problem of translating rights into concrete, tangible entitlements also 
presented itself in the CCSA’s subsequent case of Mazibuko and Others v City of 
Johannesburg and Others.
80
 The claimants, all from very poor households, argued that the 
city of Johannesburg’s policy of limiting the supply of free basic water and conditioning 
water supply on the installation of pre-payment water meters violated their right to water. The 
policy created conditions where the supply of water was insufficient to satisfy their daily 
requirements, as they could not afford to pre-pay for water beyond the allocated free amount. 
The CCSA held that the water policy was reasonable: “the City is not under a constitutional 
obligation to provide any particular amount of free water to citizens per month. It is under a 
duty to take reasonable measures progressively to realize the achievement of the right.”
81
 In 
coming to this conclusion, the CCSA would not consider evidence regarding the daily 
hardships the claimants experienced and what constituted “sufficient water.”
82
 
 Refusing to ascribe substantive content to ESR creates the danger that ESR 
adjudication will sideline “the very interests that prompted the inclusion of justiciable 
socioeconomic rights”
83
 and cause the “institutional containment and suppression of the needs 
[ESR] represent.”
84
 To reject the minimum core altogether in favour of an approach based 
solely on examining the reasonableness of state actions in the abstract risks creating the very 
danger that the CESCR sought to avoid: that the obligation to progressively realize rights will 
be misconstrued to deprive ESR of meaningful content and legitimize the deprivation of 
vulnerable and marginalized groups. 
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III. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS  
 
In order to preserve the benefits of the reasonableness approach—its flexibility, context-
sensitivity, openness, and facilitation of greater participation and deliberation in defining the 
scope of ESR—while also countering the dangers that such an approach may deprive the ESR of 
meaningful content and legitimize continued deprivation, scholars like Liebenberg have 
advocated for a “substantive reasonableness” approach. Substantive reasonableness preserves 
“the features of the minimum core approach that require heightened scrutiny of acts and 
omissions which result in a denial of basic needs.”
85
 This approach relies on the minimum core 
and the values underlying it—the “desire to protect vulnerable people from serious social and 
economic threats to their survival, health, and basic functioning of society”
86
—to promote the 
development of normative content to ESR during adjudication employing the reasonableness 
test. Liebenberg argues that,  
 
until some understanding is developed … of the content of the right, the assessment 
of whether the measures adopted by the state are reasonably capable of facilitating its 
realization takes place in a normative vacuum. Reasonableness review should thus be 
developed in a way which incorporates a principled and substantive interpretation of 
the content of socio-economic rights. Such an interpretation should seek to elucidate 




Following Liebenberg’s proposal for substantive reasonableness, Wilson and Dugard suggest 
that any ESR analysis must start with identifying the needs and interests the litigants have come 
forth to claim. The next step is to determine whether those interests fall within the scope of the 
ESR in question and, if so, to assess the weight they ought to be accorded. Only then should the 
reasonableness of the government’s actions be assessed in light of this context.
88
 When the issues 
at hand deal with basic necessities of life and well-being, the minimum core approach of 
heightening the burden of justification and lowering the degree of deference owed to the state 
can be incorporated into the analysis of whether the government’s actions were reasonable. But 
this is only possible when a preliminary identification of the interests and needs in question, and 




 Katharine Young suggests that using the minimum core to inform the reasonableness 
approach requires discarding “the goals of fixture, closure, and determinacy structured in the 
concept by its advocates.”
90
 Similarly, Liebenberg adds that the minimum core can be useful if 
we abandon its goal of universality in favour of a context-specific, case-by-case analysis of 
whether the State must furnish goods or resources to particular claimants.
91
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 There remains a great deal of room for courts to articulate substantive content to ESR 
without overstepping their institutional boundaries. While the CCSA rejected the minimum core 
as a “self-standing right conferred to everyone,” it did indicate that the minimum core could 
possibly be relevant to the reasonableness analysis.
92
 As Bilchitz points out, the minimum core 
“does not represent any particular means by which a socio-economic right can be realized; 
rather, it represents the standard of socioeconomic provision necessary to meet people’s basic 
needs,”
93
 leaving governments to choose among a number of policy options to fulfill that 
standard. Unlike the CCSA, the Colombian Constitutional Court adheres to the minimum core 
approach and has engaged the concept in a range of ESR cases. The Court has not shied away 
from ordering concrete, substantive remedies and structural injunctions, or from retaining 
supervision over the implementation of the remedy in order to facilitate dialogue between the 




In Canada, scholars have argued that the constitutional structure and the range of 
remedial options open to judges allow courts to issue judgments that leave space for the 
legislature to consider various options and respond in a manner consistent with its broader policy 
objectives. They argue that this promotes a “judicial dialogue” with other branches of 
government that is democracy-promoting rather than anti-democratic.
95
 Further, the exercise of 
judicial review promotes democracy in allowing aggrieved minorities whose interests are 
traditionally overlooked in the legislative process to have a voice in the democratic debate.
96
  
 Courts should “be alert to the ways in which the denial of access to the particular right 
creates or reinforces patterns of inequality and marginalisation in society.”
97
 As the minimum 
core addresses some of the direst aspects of socioeconomic deprivation, a higher level of judicial 
scrutiny under the reasonableness approach is warranted.
98
 As suggested above, courts can give 
ESR concrete, substantive content without unduly infringing on the powers of the legislature if 
the process facilitates dialogue and participation. The consequences of failing to do so can be 
severe. As stated by Liebenberg, “[w]ithout a recognition of this basic standard, the enjoyment of 
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all other rights is imperilled and the foundational constitutional values of human dignity, equality 




IV. CRISIS IN CANADA 
 
Critics of the minimum core suggest that because minimum core obligations aim to prevent 
deprivation of the most basic resources necessary for life, the concept has no application to high-
income countries where most individuals experience a higher standard of living. Bilchitz, 
however, compellingly argues that the minimum core approach remains relevant even to 
countries like Canada when they are dealing with situations of crisis. Bilchitz describes two 
forms of crisis: personal and structural. A personal crisis exists when “individuals are in 
desperate circumstances and lack the ability to meet the very general necessary conditions for 
being free from threats to their survival or basic well-being.”
100
 A structural crisis forms when 
there are many individuals suffering from personal crises, and “the causes of the situation are 
themselves connected with one or more social or economic system or structure. Any solution to 
the circumstances in question requires addressing the more general structural features that have 
given rise to the problem.”
101
 Bilchitz argues that “times of personal crisis are … the very 
conditions under which the general obligations flowing from [ESR] have the greatest importance 
and the positive obligations, in particular, become activated.”
102
 This is true regardless of the 
broader socio-economic conditions of any particular state. Canada faces at least two significant 
crises that trigger the obligation of positive action: the deprivation of health care from refugees 




A. CUTS TO REFUGEE HEALTH CARE 
 
In 2012, the federal government made significant cuts to Canada’s IFHP which had, for five 
decades prior, provided comprehensive health insurance coverage for refugees and refugee 
claimants. The pre-2012 IFHP provided health care benefits for medical care of an urgent or 
essential nature, emergency dental conditions, immunizations, preventative medical care, 
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contraception, dental and vision care, essential prescription medications, prenatal and obstetrical 
care, and immigration medical examinations. These benefits were provided to all individuals 
under the administrative control of Canada’s immigration authorities, whether they were 
refugees, refugee claimants, failed refugee claimants, individuals entitled only to a Pre-Removal 
Risk Assessment (PRRA),
104
 victims of human trafficking, or immigration detainees. Coverage 
was available until such persons either became eligible to receive provincial or territorial health 




 were not covered by the IFHP and not 
entitled to health care in Canada.
107
  
 The 2012 changes were instituted by way of two Orders-in-Council by the Governor in 
Council, resulting in a new, tiered system of health benefits to persons in need of protection in 
Canada: Expanded Health Care Coverage (EHCC),
108
 Health Care Coverage (HCC)
109
 and 
Public Health or Public Safety Health Care Coverage (PHPS).
110
 The tier a person will be 
                                                 
104
 Individuals subject to deportation orders generally receive one final assessment of whether they should not be 
removed because of a risk of persecution or torture or other ill treatment if returned to their country of origin: 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, ss 112–114 (IRPA).  
105
 The changes instituted are described in great detail in Canadian Doctors, supra note 11 at paras 32–87. 
106
 There is no universally accepted definition for “irregular migrants.” However, the term most often refers to 
“migrants who enter or stay in a country without correct authorization.” See UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Migrants in an Irregular Situation (United Nations: New York 
and Geneva, 2014) at 4.  
107
 See e.g. Toussaint v Canada, 2011 FCA 213 at para 14, [2013] 1 FCR 374 [Toussaint]; See also Nell Toussaint v 
Canada, Communication Submitted for Consideration Under the First Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, online: Social Rights in Canada <socialrightscura.ca/documents/legal/ 
tousaint%20IFBH/Toussaint%20v%20Canada%20HRC%20No%202348-2014.pdf> [perma.cc/TX3R-QNR2]. 
108
As described in Canadian Doctors, supra note 11 at paras 67–68: EHCC is the highest level of insurance 
available under the 2012 IFHP. It is similar to the level of health insurance coverage available to low-income 
Canadians, and substantially equivalent to the benefits provided under the pre-2012 IFHP. EHCC pays for the 
services of hospitals, physicians, nurses, and other health care professionals. Coverage is also provided for 
laboratory, diagnostic, and ambulance services, translation services for health purposes, and supplemental services 
and produces such as prescription medications, emergency dental services, vision benefits, and assistive devices. 
Those entitled to EHCC benefits include most government-sponsored refugees and some privately-sponsored 
refugees, victims of human trafficking, and some individuals admitted under a public policy or on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds.  
109
 As described in Canadian Doctors, supra note 11 at paras 69–74, HCC benefits are similar to the health 
insurance benefits received by working Canadians through their provincial or territorial health insurance plans, with 
the proviso that services and products are only covered “if they are of an urgent or essential nature” as defined in the 
IFHP. Individuals falling into this category receive coverage for hospital in-patient and out-patient services; access 
to physicians, nurses, and other health care professionals; and laboratory, diagnostic, and ambulance services, but 
only if their health problems are of an urgent or essential nature. HCC benefits do not include routine primary health 
care services such as annual check-ups, preventative health care, and standard screening tests, and the costs of most 
prescription medications. Those entitled to HCC benefits include refugee claimants from non-DCO countries, 
recognized refugees, successful PRRA applicants, most privately sponsored refugees, and all refugee claimants 
whose claims were filed before 15 December 2012, regardless of their country of origin. 
110
 As described in Canadian Doctors, supra note 11 at paras 75–78: PHPS benefits apply to refugee claimants from 
DCO countries and failed refugee claimants. These benefits only insure health care services and products necessary 
or required to diagnose, prevent, or treat a disease posing a risk to public health or public safety. Individuals coming 
from DCO countries are further restricted by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which prevents them 
from working for the first 180 days they are in Canada. This exacerbates the impact of their limited health coverage 
and hinders their ability to fund access to medical services and medication on their own. There is one final tier, 
which applies to individuals in need of protection who are found inadmissible and only entitled to Canada’s PRRA 
process. These individuals are not entitled to any health care whatsoever. People who fall within this category are 
refugee claimants found to be inadmissible to Canada on security grounds, or because of criminal activity, or human 
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entitled to under the 2012 IFHP depends on a number of factors, including (a) the stage of the 
refugee determination process an individual finds him/herself in; (b) whether the individual is 
from a Designated Country of Origin (DCO);
111
 (c) if the individual is not a refugee claimant, the 
person’s status in Canada (e.g., permanent resident, resettled refugee, victim of human 
trafficking, person with a positive PRRA decision); (d) whether the individual receives federally-
funded resettlement assistance; and (e) whether the individual is being detained.
112
 
 The cuts made to the IFHP in 2012 resulted in all refugees other than government-
sponsored refugees losing coverage for medications, vision, and dental care. Refugees from 
DCOs lost all health coverage, including for urgent and essential care, except for conditions that 
posed a threat to public health and security.
113
 Refugees entitled only to a PRRA lost coverage 
even for conditions threatening public health and security. The cuts were widely decried by 
medical practitioners, refugee and human rights advocates, and other prominent Canadians.
114
  
 To use Bilchitz’s terminology, the 2012 cuts to the IFHP can be described as a structural 
crisis that triggers Canada’s positive obligations to protect the ESR of people deprived of 
necessary health care. Such a crisis would normally engage the Canadian government’s positive 
obligations to act immediately and ensure necessary health care to a particularly vulnerable and 
marginalized group.
115
 However, where the government itself is actively causing such a crisis, 
individuals deprived of necessary health care should be able to claim remedies for the violation 
of their right to necessary health care before Canadian courts.  
                                                                                                                                                             
rights violations. It also includes those who fail to file their refugee claims in a timely manner and those who have 
previously made an unsuccessful refugee claim.  
111
 Section 109.1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, allows the Minister to designate 
“safe” countries of origin (DCO). Refugee claimants arriving in Canada from DCO countries are subject to a fast-
tracked refugee determination procedure (s 111.1). Two such countries are Mexico (which currently has epidemic 
rates of torture: See Amnesty International, Paper Promises, Daily Impunity: Mexico’s Torture Epidemic Continues, 
Index: AMR 41/2676/2015, online: <amnesty.org/en/documents/amr41/2676/2015/en/> [perma.cc/SMX9-VWUM]) 
and Hungary (where the Roma population face widespread discrimination and persecution: See Julianna Beaudoin, 
Jennifer Danch & Sean Rehaag, “No Refuge: Hungarian Romani Refugee Claimants in Canada” (2015) Osgoode 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 94). For a full list of DCOs, see Government of Canada, “Designated 
countries of origin,” online: <cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/reform-safe.asp> [perma.cc/AC66-V7TA]. 
112
 See Canadian Doctors, supra note 11. 
113
 Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care, “The Issue,” online: <doctorsforrefugeecare.ca/the-issue.html> [perma.cc/ 
MWH6-QW37]. 
114
 See e.g. “‘Day of Action’: Doctors, activists protest refugee health care cuts” CTV News (15 June 2015), online: 
CTV News <ctvnews.ca/canada/day-of-action-doctors-activists-protest-refugee-health-care-cuts-1.2423023> 
[perma.cc/R9XJ-KK6E]. Following the Federal Court’s decision, the Federal Court of Appeal ordered the 
government to implement the FC’s remedy while the appeal was pending and restore access to IFHP benefits: See 
2014 FCA 252. While the government restored some of the benefits, it failed to fully comply with the FCA’s order: 




 Indeed, the new federal government, elected in October 2015, withdrew the government’s appeal of the FC’s 
judgment in Canadian Doctors in December 2015. The new Liberal government has restored IFHP benefits to all 
Syrian refugees, and has promised to fully restore health care to refugees and refugee claimants of other nationalities 
by April 2016: see “Statement from the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship and the Minister of 
Justice and Attorney General of Canada” (16 December 2015), online: <news.gc.ca/web/article-
en.do?mthd=tp&crtr.page=1&nid=1025029&crtr.tp1D=980> [perma.cc/R73K-VR4R]; “Restoring Fairness to the 
Interim Federal Health Program” (18 February 2016), online: < http://news.gc.ca/web/article-
en.do?mthd=tp&crtr.page=1&nid=1034619&crtr.tp1D=1> [https://perma.cc/XBK2-U4T2]. 
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The constitutionality of the Orders-in-Council was challenged before the Federal Court of 
Canada in Canadian Doctors. In that case, the FC made a factual finding that the denial of health 
services resulting from the cuts to the IFHP “are causing illness, disability, and death,”
116
 
evoking the desperate circumstances of individuals being unable to meet their basic needs for 
survival and basic well-being. Consequently, the FC found that the cuts constituted cruel and 
unusual treatment in violation of section 12 of the Charter. The court also held that the 
differential treatment of refugees from DCOs under the Program was discriminatory and violated 
section 15 of the Charter. However, the FC rejected the applicants’ argument that the cuts to the 
IFHP discriminated against refugees and refugee claimants on the basis of their immigration 
status, re-affirming the decision in Toussaint
117
 that “immigration status” does not constitute an 
analogous ground under section 15.
118
  
However, despite acknowledging that “the fact that a particular claim may involve a 
request that the government spend money in a particular way is not necessarily fatal to the 
claim,”
119
 the court refused to find that the rights to life and security of the person were engaged, 
stating that section 7 does not confer a “free-standing constitutional right to state-funded health 
care ….”
120
 In doing so, the FC reinforced the same false dichotomy between positive and 
negative rights that it purported to reject by distinguishing precedents from the circumstances in 
Canadian Doctors: Chaoulli v Quebec
121
 was different because “the Supreme Court was not 
asked … to require that the Province of Quebec fund specific health services for the applicants” 
but rather to strike down the prohibition on Quebec residents spending their own money to 
access private health care.
122
 With respect to Canada v PHS Community Services Society,
123
 the 
FC found that there is “a world of difference between requiring the state to grant an exemption 
that would allow a health care provider to provide medical services funded by others and 
requiring the state itself to fund medical care.”
124
 Citing Flora v Ontario Health Insurance 
Plan,
125
 the court noted that “there is nothing in the 2012 IFHP that limits the ability of those 
seeking the protection of Canada to spend their own money to obtain health care” while at the 
same time recognizing that “the right of those affected to pay for their own medical treatment 
will be a largely illusory one.”
126
  
Reducing a right to a right to pay for a right runs contrary to the very essence of universal 
human rights, including the right to health care. While the FC acknowledged that “Conventions 
                                                 
116
 Canadian Doctors, supra note 11 at para 1049.  
117
 Toussaint, supra note 107. 
118
 Canadian Doctors, supra note 11  at para 870. While the scope of this paper has been restricted to an analysis of 
how the right to life under section 7 has been interpreted, it is worth noting that in international human rights law, it 
has been established that non-citizens fall within the “other status” category of non-discrimination provisions of 
virtually all human rights treaties. For instance, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has 
stated that “xenophobia against non-nationals, particularly migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, constitutes one of 
the main sources of contemporary racism” and has urged all States Parties to “refrain from denying or limiting” 
access to health services to non-citizens: See UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General 
Recommendation 30 on discrimination against non-citizens, 65th Sess (19 August 2004), preamble, para 36.  
119
 Canadian Doctors, supra note 11 at para 522. 
120
 Ibid at para 741.  
121
 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791. 
122
 Canadian Doctors, supra note 11 at paras 533–534. 
123
 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134 [Insite]. 
124
 Canadian Doctors, supra note 11  at para 539. 
125
 2008 ONCA 538, 91 OR (3d) 412. 
126
 Canadian Doctors, supra note 11 at para 564.  
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to which Canada is a signatory are relevant as interpretive guides in a Charter analysis and they 
will thus be taken into account for that purpose,” no international human rights principles were 
considered in the section 7 analysis.
127
 Moreover, the respondents’ (inaccurate, as this paper 
argues) submissions “that there is no right in Canada to health care based on international law, 





B. HOMELESSNESS AND INADEQUATE HOUSING 
 
In Canada, homelessness can and has been described as a serious and ongoing structural crisis.
129
 
Steady withdrawal of investments in affordable housing and social assistance by the federal and 
provincial governments since the beginning of the 1980s has created a crisis where over 235,000 
Canadians experience homelessness each year, with 35,000 experiencing homelessness on any 
given night.
130
 Enduring homelessness during harsh winters has particularly devastating effects, 
prompting the UN Human Rights Committee to express concern that “homelessness in Canada 
has led to serious health problems and even to death” and to urge Canada to “take positive 
measures required by article 6 [the right to life under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights] to address this serious problem.”
131
 In 2010, precarious housing and 
homelessness remained “a deep and persistent problem in Canada.”
132
  
 In 2009, the British Columbia Court of Appeal acknowledged the issue of homelessness 
in Victoria as a situation that engages and applies the “most lofty of guaranteed human rights—
the rights to life, liberty and security of the person—to the needs of some of the most vulnerable 
members of our society for one of the most basic of human needs, shelter.”
133
 Most recently, in 
the October 2015 judgment Abbotsford,
134
 although the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
found that bylaws prohibiting the erection of temporary shelters violated section 7 of the 
Charter, the conclusion was reached on the basis of protecting individual autonomy to make 
fundamental personal choices. The court held, problematically, that “the right to obtain the basic 
necessities of life is [not] a foundational principle underlying the guarantees of s. 7.”
135
 
In Tanudjaja, a number of applicants brought a Charter challenge against the federal and 
Ontario governments, arguing that their actions and omissions in addressing the crisis of 
homelessness and inadequate housing violated their rights to life, security of the person, and 
equality. The claim was based on the fact that the governments’ failure to address homelessness 
through an effective strategy resulted in the most serious deprivations among the most 
disadvantaged and marginalized groups, stating: “Canada and Ontario have either taken no 
                                                 
127
 Ibid at paras 474–475.  
128
 Ibid at para 469.  
129
 For a succinct summary of the housing crisis in Canada, see Young, “Charter Eviction,” supra note 7. 
130
 Stephen Gaetz, Tanya Gulliver & Tim Richter, The State of Homelessness in Canada 2014 (Toronto: The 
Homeless Hub Press, 2014) at 4–5, online: The Homeless Hub <homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/SOHC2014.pdf> 
[perma.cc/A4QB-WHTS]. 
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 UN Human Rights Committee, UN Human Rights Committee: Concluding Observations: Canada, 
CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (7 April 1999) at para 12 [Canada Concluding Observations 1999]. 
132
 Wellesley Institute, Precarious Housing in Canada (2010) online: Wellesley Institute <wellesleyinstitute.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Precarious_Housing_In_Canada.pdf> [perma.cc/AV6Y-W47B]. 
133
 Adams, supra note 4 at para 4.  
134
 Abbotsford, supra note 4. 
135
 Ibid at para 181.  
97
Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 25 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol25/iss1/4




measures, and/or have taken inadequate measures, to address the impact of [policy] changes on 
groups most vulnerable to, and at risk of, becoming homeless.” In failing to act, the applicants 
argued that the governments “have created and sustained conditions which lead to, support and 
sustain homelessness and inadequate housing.”
136
 The Notice of Application underscored that 
“[h]ousing is a necessity of life” and that international human rights law imposes on the federal 
and provincial governments the positive obligation to “take reasonable and effective measures to 
ensure the realization of the right to adequate housing.”
137
 The applicants emphasized the impact 
these policy choices have had on the lived realities of homeless people and the inadequately 
housed, leading to “reduced life expectancy, hunger, increased and significant damage to 
physical, mental and emotional health and, in some cases, death,” with disproportionate impacts 
on women, people with disabilities, Aboriginal people, refugees and migrants, racialized 
communities, seniors, and youth.
138
  
The applicants sought a declaration that the failure to adopt a strategy to address 
homelessness violated their rights to life and security of the person under section 7 of the 
Charter; that the failure to address the needs of groups disproportionately affected by 
homelessness by adopting a strategy targeting the needs of the most disadvantaged groups 
violated the right to equality under section 15; and that Canada and Ontario have obligations 
under the Charter to “implement effective national and provincial strategies to reduce and 
eventually eliminate homelessness and inadequate housing.”
139
 The applicants also sought an 
order requiring the governments to implement a strategy to address homelessness “developed in 
consultation with affected groups” and including “timetables, reporting and monitoring regimes, 
outcome measurements and complaints mechanisms.”
140
 The applicants also asked that the court 




The applicants’ arguments addressed the failures of governments to meet any of the 
requirements the CESCR has found to be of immediate application—ensuring at a minimum 
essential levels or the core content of the right, ensuring the non-discriminatory enjoyment of the 
right, and adopting clearly targeted strategies for the full realization of the right over time. The 
claim highlighted the systemic nature of the widespread personal crises that must be addressed 
by the governments in order to alleviate the hardship suffered. In such circumstances, Canada’s 
positive obligations to relieve the deprivation are triggered under international human rights law.  
However, in response to the Notice of Application, the respondents successfully brought 
a preliminary motion before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to strike the case out on the 
basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The Ontario Superior Court dismissed the 
                                                 
136
 Tanudjaja v Canada, Amended Notice of Application at para 14, online: <socialrightscura.ca/documents/ 
legal/Amended%20Not.%20of%20App.(R2H).pdf> [perma.cc/SR5D-A4ZY] [Notice of Application]. On Appeal 
before the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the Appellants emphasized that their claims were based not only on a failure 
to act, but also in concrete actions undertaken by the governments, stating: “Actions by the Respondent 
governments to amend laws, policies and programs” in the areas of affordable housing, income support, and 
accessible housing “have created and sustained increasingly widespread homelessness and inadequate housing, and 
produced severe health consequences and death among the most marginalized groups in society, contrary to Charter 
s 7 and s 15.” See Tanudjaja v Canada, Factum of the Appellants, online: <socialrightscura.ca/documents/legal/ 
motion%20to%20strike/CA%20R2H%20Appellant%20Factum.pdf> [perma.cc/5AES-Y3S7] at para 3. 
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 Notice of Application, supra note 136 at paras 6, 8.  
138
 Ibid at paras 27–33. 
139






Kwadrans: Socioeconomic Rights Adjudication in Canada: Can the Minimum Core
Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2016




claim, holding that the applicants failed to point to a concrete government decision or action that 
engaged Charter scrutiny, that “[t]here is no positive obligation on Canada or Ontario to act to 
reduce homelessness and there are no special circumstances that suggest that such an obligation 
be imposed in this case,”
142
 and that “what the applicants seek would require the court to cross 
the institutional boundary and enter into the area preserved for the Legislature.”
143
 The Court of 
Appeal for Ontario upheld the Superior Court’s dismissal of the claim, finding that the claim was 
not justiciable because “there is no sufficient legal component to engage the decision-making 
capacity of the courts,”
144
 that “the absence of any impugned law” does not permit analysis under 
section 1 of the Charter,
145
 and that “there is no judicially discoverable and manageable standard 
for assessing in general whether housing policy is adequate or whether insufficient priority has 
been given in general to the needs of the homeless.”
146
 With respect to its institutional capacity 
to hear the case, the Court of Appeal stated:  
 
This is not a question that can be resolved by application of law, but rather it engages 
the accountability of legislatures. Issues of broad economic policy and priorities are 
unsuited to judicial review. Here the court is not asked to engage in a “court-like” 
function but rather to embark on a course more resembling a public inquiry into the 
adequacy of housing policy …. Were the court to confine its remedy to a bare 
declaration that a government was required to develop a housing policy, that would 
be so devoid of content as to be effectively meaningless. To embark, as asked, on 
judicial supervision of the adequacy of housing policy developed by Canada and 




In dismissing the case, the Court of Appeal for Ontario denied the claimants an opportunity to 
present evidence of their lived experiences of deprivation, their interests, and their needs, 
which had been compiled in a record of 16 volumes, close to 10,000 pages in length, 
containing 19 affidavits of which 13 were expert affidavits.
148
 Feldman JA, dissenting, stated 
that the motion judge’s most significant error was to strike the claim without allowing an 
assessment of this voluminous evidentiary record: “It is premature and not within the intent of 
Gosselin to decide there are no ‘special circumstances’ in such a serious case, at the pleadings 
stage.”
149
 Feldman JA also stressed that motions to strike “should not be used … as a tool to 
frustrate potential developments in the law”
150
 since the question of whether section 7 of the 
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C. REINFORCING THE INTERDEPENDENCE AND INDIVISIBILITY OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA 
 
Liebenberg and Young suggest that an approach that fails to give content to and delineate the 
scope of ESR “may lead to unpredictable and potentially arbitrary judicial interventions.”
152
 This 
has certainly been the case in Canadian ESR jurisprudence, particularly in relation to section 7 of 
the Charter. In Gosselin v Quebec, the SCC considered the 1984 social assistance scheme 
implemented by the Quebec government that excluded citizens under 30 from receiving full 
social security benefits. While it did not find a violation of section 7 of the Charter, the Court 
“left open the possibility that a positive obligation to sustain life, liberty, or security of the person 
may be made out in special circumstances.”
153
 In 2011, the SCC found that the government’s 
refusal to exempt Insite, a supervised drug injection site, from the operation of the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act violated section 7 of the Charter because it prevented injection drug 
users from accessing necessary health services, putting their lives in danger.
154
 That same year, 
the Federal Court of Appeal held that the denial of access to the IFHP for irregular migrants 
engaged the right to life under section 7 of the Charter, but that the denial was consistent with 
the principles of fundamental justice.
155
 Yet, in Canadian Doctors, the FC refused to find that the 
section 7 Charter right to life was engaged at all by the 2012 cuts to the IFHP.
156
  
 While courts in British Columbia held in 2009 and 2015 that the prohibition against 
temporary overnight shelters for the homeless violated section 7 of the Charter, in Tanudjaja the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario refused the homeless a hearing altogether. And despite the Court’s 
reluctance in Tanudjaja to venture into questions of policy and resource allocation, the SCC had 
no trouble, after finding a violation of the Charter section 15 right to equality in Eldridge v 
British Columbia, with ordering hospitals in British Columbia to provide sign language 
interpretation services when necessary in the delivery of health services.
157
 As the FC observed 
in Canadian Doctors, “Courts have been far less reluctant to impose positive obligations on 
governments in order to ensure substantive equality.”
158
  
Moreover, in Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia, the SCC upheld a structural injunction 
imposed by the trial judge for Nova Scotia to construct French-language schools in order to 
preserve residents’ section 23 minority education rights under the Charter.
159
 The order included 
continued court supervision over the implementation of the remedy, requiring the government to 
provide the court with periodic progress reports. The Court stated:  
 
The power of courts to issue injunctions against the executive is central to s. 24(1) of 
the Charter which envisions more than declarations of rights. Courts do take actions 
to ensure that rights are enforced, and not merely declared …. Section 24(1) of the 
Charter requires that courts issue effective, responsive remedies that guarantee full 
and meaningful protection of Charter rights and freedoms. The meaningful 
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protection of Charter rights, and in particular the enforcement of s. 23 rights, may in 




 The more recent ESR cases dealing with the right to life demonstrate that Canada lags 
behind the international community in recognizing the indivisibility and interdependence of all 
human rights. At least on the international stage, Canada has maintained that the Charter is the 
primary vehicle by which it fulfills its international human rights obligations, and that section 7 
of the Charter protects everyone in Canada against deprivations of the basic necessities of life.
161
 
For example, Canada has stated that the right to life “requires Canada to take the necessary 
legislative measures to protect the right to life [which] may relate to the protection of the health 
and social well-being of individuals.”
162
 Yet, this has clearly not born out in Canadian courts. In 
its Concluding Observations on Canada in March 2016 the CESCR criticized Canada for failing 
to ensure the justiciability of ESR in domestic courts and access to remedies for 
disproportionately disadvantaged and marginalized groups, including homeless persons. The 
Committee recommended that Canada broaden “the interpretation of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, notably sections 7, 12 and 15, to include economic social and cultural 
rights, and thus ensure the justiciability of Covenant rights.”
163
 The Special Rapporteur on 
adequate housing has also stressed that the judiciary of a State Party to the ICESCR “must 
develop its capacity and commitment to adjudicating [homelessness] claims, including where the 
claims seek a remedy requiring positive measures.”
164
 In its March 2016 observations the 
CESCR also took Canada to task for withholding health care from undocumented migrants, and 
recommended that Canada “ensure access to the Interim Federal Health Program without 
discrimination based on immigration status.”
165
 So too, in July 2015, the Human Rights 
Committee recommended that Canada ensure, as a requirement under the ICCPR, that all refugee 
claimants and migrants in Canada have access to essential health care.
166
 The CESCR has 
warned that States Parties who maintain arbitrary and rigid distinctions between “positive” and 
“negative” rights significantly impede the capacity of courts to protect those who are most 
vulnerable and marginalized.
167
 The SCC has established that Canadian law must develop 
consistently with international human rights law and, absent express indications to the contrary, 
should be presumed to conform with international human rights standards.
168
 As such, Canadian 
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courts remain an important (but by no means the sole
169
) avenue for the vulnerable to obtain 
meaningful redress for the violation of their human rights and access to substantive entitlements. 
As a State Party to international human rights treaties, Canada must get over this justiciability 
barrier and Canadian courts must ensure access to justice and meaningful remedies for the 
infringement of all human rights under the Charter. As the CESCR has stated:  
 
A state party seeking to justify its failure to provide any domestic legal remedies for 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights would need to show either that such 
remedies are not ‘appropriate means’ within the terms of article 2.1 of the Covenant 
or that, in view of the other means used, they are unnecessary. It will be difficult to 
show this and the Committee considers that, in many cases, the other “means” used 





V. APPLICABILITY OF THE MINIMUM CORE TO CANADA 
 
Might the concept of the minimum core or substantive reasonableness be productively brought to 
bear on the interpretation and application of section 7 of the Charter? The above analysis of the 
concept suggests that the minimum core approach may provide an interpretive aid in assisting 
Canadian courts to bring Canada into compliance with its international human rights obligations 
by shifting the focus of the inquiry to the values underpinning the minimum core and ESR 
generally: the protection of vulnerable and marginalized groups from the most serious forms of 
deprivation and human suffering. As the substantive reasonableness approach suggests, the 
starting point in any inquiry should be the interests and needs of the claimants as experienced 
through their lived realities, then a determination of whether those needs and interests fall within 
the scope of the right in question and the weight that should be accorded to them. Only then 
ought a state policy be assessed in terms of its reasonableness, in the context of the substance of 
the right in a particular case. If circumstances are so degrading as to threaten the lives and basic 
well-being of individuals, minimum core obligations are not being met, individuals are found in 
situations of crisis, governments bear the duty to undertake immediate action to alleviate 
suffering, and courts have an obligation to provide meaningful remedies to vindicate these rights. 
These are precisely the types of concerns that warrant heightened Charter scrutiny. In the 
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context of the analysis of the rights to life and security of the person under section 7 of the 
Charter, this paper suggests that the minimum core approach is relevant in several ways. 
 
A. THE JUSTICIABILITY QUESTION 
 
Canadian courts have a responsibility to ensure that Canadian law develops consistently with the 
norms and principles established in international law.
171
 International human rights law mandates 
that States Parties provide a certain substantive, tangible, minimum core of ESR necessary for 
survival and basic necessities for life. The CESCR recognizes that there may be circumstances 
where even the minimum core content of ESR may be impossible to fulfil, but requires a high 
standard of justification from States Parties to the ICESCR if that is the case. States must 
demonstrate that they have attempted to use all available resources to meet their minimum 
obligations on a priority basis.
172
 
 Under international human rights law, the minimum core should not be confused for a 
standard of justiciability, which instead derives from the principle that effective remedies must 
be provided to all components of ESR, including the requirement to progressively realize those 
rights. However, the fact that allegations of infringements of the minimum core require a high 
degree of scrutiny into government policy choices and budgetary allocations suggests that access 
to courts is indispensable in ensuring that minimum obligations are fulfilled, since judiciaries are 
particularly well-positioned to undertake such analyses. States Parties to the ICESCR bear the 
obligation of providing access to hearings and meaningful remedies for the violation of ESR, 
especially when it comes to matters of necessities for life and basic well-being.  
 The minimum core may assist courts in distinguishing general matters of socio-economic 
policy that are beyond the proper role of courts from those which engage Charter-protected 
rights. Courts should not decline to hear ESR-related claims merely out of concern that they will 
infringe on the legislature’s policymaking powers by potentially ordering the government to take 
positive action to address the deprivation in question. The minimum core can assist courts in 
delineating those aspects of ESR that most directly engage Charter-protected interests and values 
and provide courts with guidance as to the appropriate standards against which government 
policies and programs ought to be assessed. To decline to consider a claim because of a 
reluctance to order the provision of tangible goods or to give ESR substance has the consequence 
of depriving the rights of any meaningful content—particularly for the most disadvantaged. As 
this paper has suggested, courts have a flexible array of options in considering these issues in a 
manner respectful of other branches of government. If the minimum core is accepted as an 
interpretive tool for the adjudication of ESR-related claims, the focus shifts towards illuminating 
the obvious: that the deprivations and hardships faced by society’s most vulnerable and 
marginalized are inherently questions of life and security of the person that should attract 
Charter scrutiny.  
 Further, the minimum core may be helpful not only in establishing the justiciability of 
ESR, but also in determining which interests and needs connected to socioeconomic deprivations 
fall within the proper scope of section 7 of the Charter. If government action or inaction results 
directly in individuals freezing on the streets, or dying because they lose access to necessary 
health services, these must be recognized as fundamental human rights issues protected by the 
Charter. The minimum core refocuses the analysis on the lived realities of some of the most 
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vulnerable individuals and groups in Canada. The severity of their suffering falls well within the 
scope of section 7 and should be accorded significant weight, and only then should the 
acceptability of the government’s policy and budgetary choices be assessed in this context.  
 
B. PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE AND SECTION 1 
PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
 
Infringements of section 7 of the Charter are permitted if they are in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice, including the principle of gross disproportionality. A law’s 
impact will be grossly disproportionate when it is “so extreme that [it is] per se disproportionate 
to any legitimate government interest.”
173
 Those infringements must further be “demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society” under section 1 of the Charter,
174
 which the SCC 
determined requires a separate proportionality analysis that considers whether the infringements 
are rationally connected to a legitimate objective, whether they impair the right as little as 
possible, and whether the effects of the measures taken are proportionate to the aims sought.
175
  
If, as in both Canadian Doctors and Tanudjaja, the deprivations in question engage the 
minimum core—in other words, survival and basic necessities for life and well-being—it is 
difficult to imagine how imposing or enabling these hardships could be proportionate to any 
legitimate objective.  
 Bilchitz argues that proportionality “only works where we have a pre-existing 
understanding of the content of particular rights and the weight to be accorded to them.”
176
 The 
minimum core is essential in establishing this pre-existing understanding. In order to determine 
whether a right is minimally impaired, “one needs to have some understanding of the pre-
existing content of such a fundamental right as otherwise the test will be meaningless: how can 
one judge the impact of different measures on a right if one does not know what one is having an 
impact upon?”
177
 Similarly, with respect to the final balancing of effects of the infringements 
against the stated aim, Bilchitz states that,  
 
it is only possible to make a judgment as to whether the harms to the right caused by 
the limiting measure are proportional to the benefits to be achieved by it if we have 
some pre-existing idea as to what the right entails, and how to judge the seriousness 
of any violation thereof. The inquiry also requires us to have some understanding of 




It may be the case that sometimes, as in Eldridge,
179
 the content of Charter rights may be 
informed by principles of reasonableness and proportionality. However, there is no question that 
the more traditional analysis under the Oakes test works best when the content of the right is 
considered separately from the consideration of whether a limitation on the right is reasonable 
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and demonstrably justifiable. The minimum core may therefore help inform the implementation 
of the well-developed proportionality inquiry established in Canadian law. In the case of 
homelessness in Canada or denials of access to health care necessary to preserve life, courts need 
not engage with more difficult questions of how fully Canada ought to have realized the rights to 
housing or health based on its current level of development and available resources. What is at 
stake in these cases is the minimum core, the most essential levels of enjoyment of these rights. 
In such cases, claimants must have access to courts to seek effective remedies, and courts have a 
clear responsibility to demand of governments clear and compelling evidence to justify any 
violations of these fundamental rights. 
 
C. GREATER BUDGETARY SCRUTINY UNDER SECTION 1 
 
Hardships and deprivations involving matters concerning the minimum core should attract a 
higher degree of scrutiny from courts into the government’s prioritization of budgetary 
allocations. The SCC has stated that, while it will look at budgetary considerations as a 
justification for rights violations under section 1 of the Charter with great skepticism, “the courts 
cannot close their eyes to the periodic occurrence of financial emergencies when measures must 
be taken to juggle priorities to see a government through the crisis.”
180
 In Newfoundland 
(Treasury Board) v NAPE, the SCC held that the government of Newfoundland’s legislation to 
deny female employees in the health sector pay equity was discriminatory. However, the Court 
also held that this discrimination was justified under section 1 as a measure to deal with a fiscal 
crisis after deeper scrutiny of evidence provided by the state regarding its budgetary decisions.
181
 
Thus, while violations of the minimum core—or socioeconomic deprivations engaging life and 
security of the person—may be justified on the basis of government decisions in setting priorities 
and making budgetary allocations, such justifications should be approached with a high degree of 
scepticism and subjected to a heightened burden of justification. As Liebenberg stated, a “failure 
to ensure … basic social provisioning should only be justifiable when resources are 
demonstrably inadequate, or other competing justifications exist.”
182
 In order to allow courts to 
make a proper assessment of the government’s justification, “courts should examine resources 
available in the national budget as a whole as opposed to focusing exclusively on existing 
allocations.”
183
 This in turn requires governments to “place the necessary budgetary and policy 
information before the court in support of its justificatory arguments.”
184
  
 Special attention should be paid to scrutinizing rights-based versus non-rights-based 
budgetary allocations. Karin Lehman, for instance, argues that, 
 
[t]he true discontent that informs constitutional adjudication about socio-economic 
rights is with the government’s macro-economic policy choices and with the 
government’s broad budgetary allocations. It is with the choice of neo-liberal, macro-
economic policies that prioritize growth rather than redistribution, and with the 
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government’s decision to spend twice as much on defense than on either the 




As Lehman points out, courts “would have little difficulty in finding that a father’s purchase of 
the latest BMW is unreasonable if it means that his children are reduced to a diet of bread, water, 
and gruel.”
186
 Another basis of comparison, according to Porter, would be the resource 




D. CREATING BENCHMARKS FOR THE REALIZATION OF ESR—IN 
COURT AND OUTSIDE OF COURT 
 
The above analysis suggested that the minimum core approach, contrary to perceptions that it is 
counter-majoritarian and anti-democratic, can actually foster democracy by encouraging a 
dialogue between the judiciary, legislature, and relevant stakeholders. This can be accomplished 
through implementing a remedy over which the court maintains supervisory jurisdiction, or by 
stakeholders working together outside of the courtroom in a participatory manner to establish 
priorities, create goals, and set concrete, minimum benchmarks for the realization of ESR. 
Wilson and Dugard note that individuals and groups come to the courts when their voices have 
been overlooked in the democratic process.
188
 As such, in adopting a substantive reasonableness 
approach that preserves the minimum core, the mere fact of starting the Charter analysis by 
ascertaining the needs, interests, and lived realities of individuals and groups affected by severe 
socioeconomic deprivations adds a voice to the debate that has been overlooked in the 
democratic process as well as by the judiciary when it dismisses a matter for lack of 
justiciability.  
 The CESCR has identified such stakeholder participation as a significant element in 
determining whether a government is acting reasonably with respect to the fulfilment of any 
particular ESR.
189
 As the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing has put it, states must 
recognize the homeless and the vulnerable as “rights holders resilient in the struggle for survival 
and dignity” and “as central agents of the social transformation.”
190
 While the reasonableness 
standard “imposes an obligation on all actors to make decisions consistent with a firm 
commitment to the progressive realization of ESR, with access to judicial and effective remedies 
and meaningful participation by rights-holders,”
191
 the minimum core approach highlights the 
need to give substantive content to those rights by setting tangible benchmarks for the provision 
of concrete resources, in the short- medium- and long-term, to fulfil ESR. The minimum core 
also provides a reminder that in setting these benchmarks, the needs of the most vulnerable 
should be prioritized. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
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Though articulating the minimum core is fraught with difficulties, the concept remains an 
important reminder to the States Parties to the ICESCR of what is at stake when considering 
matters of ESR: deprivation of society’s most vulnerable individuals and groups from the very 
resources that are essential to life and basic well-being. Especially in societies like Canada where 
the general standard of living is quite high, the state cannot permit these types of deprivations—
let alone be responsible for causing them—and has an obligation to act to alleviate such 
hardships. When states fail to fulfil their obligations under international human rights law, courts 
have an obligation to provide remedies for ESR violations. States’ obligations under 
international human rights law extend to all branches of governments, which all have heightened 
obligations to protect and fulfil the minimum core of ESR. The minimum core of ESR and 
substantive reasonableness are potentially useful interpretive aids to assess the content of 
Charter rights and to order meaningful remedies for their violation in full respect of institutional 
boundaries. This paper considered a number of areas where the minimum core could play a role 
in the adjudication of ESR in Canada, suggesting that by re-orienting the focus from 
preconceived notions of institutional roles or false divisions between civil and political and ESR, 
back to the human experience of those who claim their Charter rights in these cases, Canada 
might catch up with the rest of the international community in affirming the interdependence, 
indivisibility, and justiciability of all human rights.  
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